There was a time when Henry
Kissinger dominated the news. As Richard
Nixon’s national security advisor and then as Secretary of State under Nixon
and Gerald Ford, he was central to formulating and executing our foreign
policy. What is more, he had a
well-earned reputation for expertise.
Kissinger was smart, and
knowledgeable, and had a way of communicating with the media, that contributed
to his personal power. As an ardent
student of history, he appreciated the need for an international balance of
power and did his best to establish one.
Nonetheless, the historian
Niall Ferguson has identified a conundrum at the heart of Kissinger’s political
career. How was a man, who started out
as a scholar, able to rise to the summit of diplomatic power? How did he manage to exercise as much executive
influence as he did?
Ferguson points out that
academics almost never hold high level government offices. They are generally behind the scene advisors
because they are usually terrible decision makers. More often interested in getting every detail
right, they dither when it comes time to choose.
Kissinger was an
exception. He loved to turn ideas into
concrete policies. He enjoyed wading in
and getting his hands dirty in the nitty-gritty of political maneuvering. One of the reasons was that he had no
confidence in bureaucratic acumen. As
such, he did not trust careerists in the State Department.
According to Kissinger,
bureaucrats fall in love with rules.
They value predictability so highly that they spin webs of regulations,
which then tie everyone down. Decisions
do not get made because no one wants to challenge the status quo. No one wants to lose his or her job by being
too independent.
Paradoxically, this attitude
has the opposite effect during negotiations.
Because bureaucrats seldom have principles, they take their cues about
deal making from their opponents. Rather
than going into sessions knowing what they want, they attempt to discover what
the other side is willing to give.
Kissinger possessed a more
stable personal compass. As a result, he
was able to make choices on the spot. He
could size up events, zero in on potential opportunities, and make adjustments
on the fly. This enabled him to formulate
significant changes, as they were required.
The upshot was that
Kissinger relied more on networking than on hierarchical institutions. He developed relationships in government and
with foreign leaders that facilitated flexibility. Because he knew those with whom he was
dealing, he could achieve agreements based on trust.
Bureaucrats are typically
less supple. They may be good at
political infighting, but are customarily more concerned with staying out of
trouble than pioneering new ventures.
Their eye is on the next promotion, not necessarily the best interests
of the organization.
We see this in most federal
agencies, in huge corporations, and even on college campuses. Bureaucrats are empire builders. Their goal is apt to be increasing the number
of their subordinates, rather than achieving the company's mission.
Cyril Parkinson told us that
work expands to fill the time allotted to it.
He was thinking of government bureaucracies, where additional people
doing less is regarded as a sign of success.
Obviously, the more underlings an administrator manages the more
prestigious he must be.
When Donald Trump talks
about draining the swamp, it is this morass of inefficiency he has in
mind. When he tells us that the State
Department can make do with fewer employees, he is not trying to hobble the
agency, but to improve its ability to function.
Bureaucrats always tell us
that they need more help. They always
insist that they are understaffed and that making cuts will destroy morale and
prevent crucial work from being completed.
These, however, are rationalizations.
They are not based upon facts, but careerist ambitions.
In the old Soviet Union, the
Moscow based bureaucrats, who controlled the economy, believed they were
smarter and more efficient than those whose tasks they planned. In fact, they nearly brought the nation to a
standstill. The same could happen in the
United States.
We therefore need less
bureaucracy and more decentralization; fewer high priced bosses and more
professionalized experts. Kissinger was
right—and so is Trump.
Melvyn L. Fein, Ph.D.
Professor of Sociology
Kennesaw State University
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