I am not a general. I am not an expert on tactics or
logistics. Nor do I receive intelligence
reports about the comparative assets of the United States and North Korea. What then qualifies me to make projections
about a potential conflict on the Korean peninsula? The answer is very little.
So why am I about to engage
in this exercise? It is because a great
many less qualified commentators are doing so.
Furthermore, because most of them have a pacifist bent, they are eager
to point out how destructive such a clash would be. With hundreds of thousands, and perhaps
millions of potential casualties, they imply it would not be worth it.
Although these observers
typically say that all options should be on the table, many express a willingness
to accept a nuclear-armed North. I am
not. Not only would this rogues state
represent an existential threat to us, but its ability to sell its technology
is terrifying.
What if Hamas got these
weapons? What about Boko Haram? We have a nuclear nonproliferation treaty,
but what does this mean if there is no way to enforce it. The prospect of a worldwide arms race is unthinkable. Something must be done!
As it happens, the opponents
of a military intervention usually make a huge mistake. They point out that over twenty million
residents of Seoul are within artillery range of the DMZ and that the North has
thousands of these weapons. Ponder, they
ask, the extent of the devastation?
What they leave out of the
equation is that Seoul can be evacuated—just as Miami was prior to Hurricane
Irma. Why would people allow themselves
to be sitting ducks? Wouldn’t moving
south reduce their risk?
So here is my
suggestion. The United States should
send Kim Jung-On an ultimatum. Destroy
your atomic weapons, the means of producing them, and your ICBMs or we will use
stand-off armaments to do this for you.
Furthermore, you must allow inspectors to verify that you have done so.
Americans do not need to
deploy ground troops. Nor do a majority
of inspectors need to be American. The
Chinese can be permitted to do the job.
They must also be made to understand that we have no desire to remove
the North as a buffer against the West.
If the Chinese refuse to
accept this and begin moving troops over the border, we can speed up our
timetable. But what if the South refuses
to evacuate. This is possible, but it is
difficult to imagine a politician surviving a refusal to protect his people.
If this sounds bellicose, it
is not much more than what was done during the Cuban missile crisis. Back then president Kennedy found the
prospect of nuclear armed missiles on our doorstep intolerable. He thus regarded it as his duty to protect
our welfare.
Today the reach of the North
Koreans is greater and so it is their ability to hit us that should be the
trigger. Lest we forget, Kennedy was
willing to risk nuclear war to deter the Russians. He dispatched warships to blockade Cuba and to
confront the Soviets.
Would On back down the way
Khrushchev did? Would the Chinese be
satisfied with preserving their hegemony over the North? It is impossible to say. This makes the danger of precipitating a
confrontation substantial. Our
calculations could go wrong.
But consider the
alternative. If we are never willing to
use our military assets, it is as if we did not have them. If all we are prepared to do is rattle
them—and our enemies know this—we might be challenged at any moment. Each time we backed down, our adversaries
would be emboldened to push a bit harder.
The protection of democracy
is not free. Our ancestors knew this and
therefore they took chances from which we benefit. Did they shed their blood so that we can
retreat into appeasement and cowardice?
It is now our turn to step
up to the plate. But we should not be
reckless. We ought never be heedless of
the consequences of our actions. But
neither should we be pusillanimous. If
strategic patience means never defending ourselves, it will not be long before
there is nothing left to defend.
Melvyn L, Fein, Ph.D.
Professor of Sociology
Kennesaw State University
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